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Trust has been investigated across many psychology 
sub-disciplines. However, there is a debate in the 
literature as to whether a) trust is a continuum ranging 
from trust to distrust or b) if trust and distrust are 
orthogonal constructs. The present research 
investigated these postulates by assessing self-
reported measures of trust and distrust before and 
after an experimental task. Participants engaged in a 
trust game and were randomized to experience trust or 
distrust behaviors across several trials. The results 
showed that self-reported measures of trust and 
distrust were highly correlated. Moreover, the 
experimental manipulation evidenced comparable 
effects on both trust and distrust criterion. The results 
support the postulate that trust and distrust compose a 
continuum, with trust at one end and distrust at the 
other. Practically speaking, researchers may wish to 
simply assess a measure of trust rather than assessing 
multiple self-report measures of the same construct 
(i.e., trust and distrust). 
1. Introduction  
Trust is an important interpersonal construct and 
has provided fodder for research since the late 1950s 
[see 1]. Twenty-five years ago, a review of the extant 
literature led to an explication of the trust process [2]. 
Therein, Mayer et al. defined trust as “the willingness 
of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another 
party based on the expectation that the other will 
perform a particular action important to the trustor, 
irrespective of the ability to monitor or control the 
other party” (p. 712). From this seminal article, 
researchers have shown that Mayer and colleagues’ 
postulates are both relevant and model the trust 
process in person-to-person [3] and team [4] contexts. 
Furthermore, these postulates have been applied to 
distributed teaming contexts [5] as well as trust toward 
automation [6] and robot contexts [7]. 
Shortly after [2]’s seminal paper, Lewicki et al. 
published their conceptualization of the trust process 
[8]. Though this model had several similarities to that 
of [2]’s model, [8] explicitly postulated that trust and 
distrust are orthogonal. That is, trust and distrust are 
distinct constructs. Lewicki and colleagues cited 
several examples from the neighboring literatures on 
affect [9] and attitudes [10] to support their model of 
trust and distrust as orthogonal constructs. Nearly a 
decade later, Schoorman et al. [11] responded to the 
postulates of [8], arguing that rather trust spans a 
continuum ranging from trust to distrust [11]. 
Both of these groups of researchers [2; 8; see also 
11] have theoretically argued for their model of trust 
and have cited empirical research claiming it supports 
their postulates. However, except for a few studies, 
which have cited the discrepancies between the 
models [12; 13], the authors of the present research are 
not aware of any research that has directly tested the 
models of both [2] and [8]. That is, the authors are 
unaware of an experiment that has investigated 
whether trust and distrust are represented on a 
continuum or as two orthogonal constructs. In the 
current paper, the assumptions of both models are 
reviewed along with relevant citations which bolster 
the respective groups’ arguments. We present an 
experiment which aimed to directly compare whether 
trust is more usefully measured as a continuum or as 
an orthogonal construct to distrust. 
Trust research has implications for the 
multidisciplinary fields of system sciences and 





information systems [14; 15], particularly computer-
mediated interaction (e.g., [16, 17]). As interactions 
become more distributed and teams of teams become 
more heterogeneous in their composition, 
understanding when and why trust impacts 
performance outcomes will continue to increase in 
importance (e.g., [18]). As such, having an appropriate 
conceptualization and measurement of the trust 
construct will aid researchers in testing hypotheses 
pertaining to trust and uncovering how it influences 
interactions in a multitude of contexts. 
2. Related Work 
2.1. Two Prominent Models of Interpersonal 
Trust 
Mayer and colleagues’ [2] formative paper 
explicates the trust process. That is, the willingness to 
accept vulnerability (i.e., trust) has both antecedents 
and consequences. Antecedents to trust are both state-
dependent and trait-based. As characteristics of the 
referent help to determine whether a trustor will accept 
vulnerability, [2] postulated three main antecedents to 
trust that are indicative of the trustor’s perceptions of 
the referent. These characteristics of the referent are 
ability, benevolence, and integrity. Ability concerns 
the trustor’s perceptions of the referent’s competence 
and capabilities to do something relevant to the trustor. 
Benevolence concerns the perceptions the trustor has 
about the referent having their best interest in mind 
outside of the referent’s own egocentric motivations. 
Integrity concerns the perceptions that the referent 
possesses principles and ethics relevant to the 
interchange that the trustor finds acceptable. In 
addition, propensity to trust is a willingness to trust 
others in general. This generalized expectation of and 
willingness to accept vulnerability from others is 
considered to shape trust early on in an interchange 
when a trustor knows little about the referent [see also 
19; 20]. Together, these state- and trait-based 
antecedents help to predict whether the trustor will 
trust the referent [2; 11]. The antecedents may be 
differently influential on trust; for instance, a referent 
may be perceived as competent in their ability to 
accomplish that which the trustor holds to be 
important, but if the trustor does not perceive the 
referent to be ethical or have their best interest in mind, 
the trustor may not be willing to trust them. Together, 
these antecedents predict one’s willingness to trust, 
which is an intention to be vulnerable. 
Researchers have utilized [2]’s model of trust to 
guide their research across a litany of studies. 
Jarvenpaa and colleagues [5] found that perceptions of 
a referent’s integrity and ability, along with the 
trustor’s propensity to trust (i.e., the general 
willingness to accept vulnerability toward others), 
were related to trust early on in an interchange 
between ad hoc distributed teammates. Later, 
however, perceptions of benevolence were related to 
trust. In a meta-analysis, Colquitt et al. [3] showed that 
[2]’s model of trust is relevant to predicting workplace 
behaviors. Specifically, perceptions of ability, 
benevolence, and integrity, as well as propensity to 
trust, are predictive of trust and some performance 
outcomes, and that trust is directly related to 
performance outcomes. However, [2]’s 
conceptualization of trust is described as a continuum 
of accepting vulnerability. Specifically, not only were 
the trustworthiness antecedents as well as propensity 
to trust postulated to span a continuum, so too was the 
willingness to be vulnerable to a referent [see also 11]. 
Around the same time as [2]’s initial work, [8] 
published their paper on the trust process, which we 
will turn to next. 
Lewicki et al. [8], similar to [2], postulated that 
trust may be a willingness to accept vulnerability. 
However, [8] believe that distrust—a confident 
negative expectation regarding another’s conduct—is 
theoretically orthogonal from trust. Specifically, [8]’s 
central argument resides with the suppositions of 
ambivalence. Lewicki and colleagues cite literature 
about individuals that can have positive and negative 
attitudes toward quitting smoking [21], particular 
races [22], and job satisfaction [23]. In all of these 
examples, [8] make the central assumptions that just 
as positive and negative affect can be ascribed to a 
referent, so too can trust and distrust. Take the 
example in which a person may want to purchase a 
bike. The individual may want to exercise, become 
healthier, and have a more eco-friendly way to get to 
and from work. However, the individual may also feel 
hesitant because increasing their biking frequency 
may not be the safest mode of transportation, and they 
do not want to spend money on a new mode of 
transportation. Thus, the individual exhibits 
ambivalence toward the bike purchase. Just as a person 
may attribute this ambivalence to a referent, so too can 
a trustor ascribe ambivalence toward a trustee.  
However, it should be noted that although [8] 
argue that trust and distrust are orthogonal, they stated 
that this theory should be empirically studied to 
determine the relationship between the two constructs. 
2.2. Trust and Distrust: A Continuum or 
Orthogonal Constructs? 
Schoorman et al. [11] argued that in contrast to the 
postulates of [8], trust is not orthogonal to distrust but 
rather spans a continuum from trust to distrust. 
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Schoorman and colleagues [11] cite the definition of 
trust and deduce that the absence of trust is distrust. 
Specifically, they cite both the Webster’s and Random 
House dictionary definitions, which defined distrust as 
a lack/absence of trust or to have no trust, respectively, 
along with definitions from sociology, which convey 
similarly that distrust is to have no trust. The authors 
also argue that often people may ascribe differential 
perceptions of trustworthiness toward referents 
depending on the attribute of the referent that they are 
focusing. For instance, a trustor may find a colleague 
to have sound investment judgement in their financial 
decisions for a company at work. However, that same 
colleague may have poor judgement in managing their 
personal funds. Thus, the trustor may perceive the 
colleague has integrity in their financial dealings in the 
workplace but not in their personal finances. What [8] 
postulate as ambivalence is actually perceptions of 
trustworthiness toward the referent in two different 
contexts (i.e., the colleague’s financial integrity in the 
workplace and their personal financial integrity). 
From this, trust antecedents as well as intentions to be 
vulnerable (i.e., trust), reside along a continuum. 
Theoretically, [11]—expanding [2]’s initial theories to 
directly respond to [8]—provide a deductive argument 
that trust resides along a continuum with distrust at one 
end and trust at the other end. The space between these 
two extremes characterizes variability in the degree to 
which a trustor trusts a referent. 
Recently, researchers have begun to investigate 
whether state-based measures of trust and distrust are 
unique constructs. Indeed, Lyons et al. [24] conducted 
an exploratory factor analysis and demonstrated trust 
and distrust emerged as unique constructs. Trust and 
distrust predicted differential variance in criterion 
(e.g., participants’ decision confidence toward their 
route selection in a simulated military convoy task). 
However, [24] may have observed two distinct factors 
that related to item valence (i.e., positive or negative) 
rather than two trust factors. Thus, more research is 
needed to determine the exact nature of trust and 
distrust. 
McKnight and Choudhury [25] explored trust and 
distrust in a business to consumer electronic-
commerce setting. They tested whether trust and 
distrust demonstrated discriminate validity and if trust 
and distrust differed in their predictions of willingness 
to use a fictional website. In their study, participants 
were presented with a (fictional) website that provided 
legal advice and were asked to rate their (dis)trust 
intention in the website, willingness to follow website 
advice, and other characteristics of the websites. They 
found trust intentions were a stronger predictor of risk-
taking behavior (i.e., following a website’s advice) 
than were distrust intentions. A hypothesis test found 
that the positive correlation between trust intentions 
and following the websites advice was significantly 
greater than the negative correlation between distrust 
intentions and following the websites advice. As such, 
[25] propose that trust and distrust are orthogonal and 
should be measured separately. However, their 
measure of willingness to follow the website overlaps 
with [2]’s definition of trust, which is a willingness to 
be vulnerable. Therefore, the findings from their study 
should be interpreted with caution. 
Mittendorf [26] investigated the relationship 
between trust and distrust in a rideshare context. 
Specifically, participants were asked to rate their trust 
and distrust in a ridesharing platform, as well as the 
rideshare drivers. In addition, participants rated their 
intentions to engage and request a ride from the 
particular rideshare platform. Trust and distrust toward 
both rideshare and driver referents were moderately 
(negatively) correlated. In addition, trust toward the 
platform (but not the driver) and distrust toward the 
driver (but not the platform) were (negatively) 
correlated with intentions to engage. As such, the 
researcher concluded that trust and distrust emerged as 
separate constructs. This finding aligns with [8]’s 
argument that trust and distrust are orthogonal factors 
that should be assessed separately. However, [26] may 
have conflated measures of trust and distrust and their 
intentions to engage variables. Specifically, the 
intentions to engage variable could be considered trust 
as per definitions from [2] and the instruments from 
Mayer and Davis [27], i.e., willingness (or intentions) 
to be vulnerable. In addition, [26]’s measures of trust 
and distrust, though carefully separating referents of 
the platform and driver (see also [11]), conflate 
trustworthiness and trust constructs explicated by [2]. 
Therefore, caution should be exercised when 
interpreting these results. 
More recently, Saunders et al. [13] utilized card 
sort methodologies and interview techniques to 
ascertain whether individuals working in two different 
contexts ascribe differential trust and distrust toward 
workplace change experiences (i.e., positively and 
negatively perceived organizational restructuring). 
They asked participants to rate their emotions toward 
49 different categories—several of which were 
outlined in [8] as pertaining to trust and distrust—in 
reference to the organizational changes. Participants 
rated their emotions on a 4-category ordinal scale from 
‘do not feel’ (coded as ‘low’) to ‘feel to some extent 
(coded as ‘weak’), ‘feel strongly,’ and ‘feel most 
strongly’ (both coded as ‘high’). This card sort was 
followed up with in-depth interviews asking 
participants to elaborate on their selections. Saunders 
et al. [13] found that some individuals did in fact 
ascribe feelings of differential trust and distrust toward 
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a workplace referent, particularly in feelings of low 
trust and high distrust (i.e., high and weak distrust 
characterizations), high trust and low distrust (i.e., 
high and weak trust characterizations), and low trust 
and low distrust (i.e., absence of both trust and 
distrust). These results support [8]’s postulates that 
trust and distrust can co-occur. Importantly, however, 
[13] found only one instance in which a participant 
described a scenario laden with both high trust and 
high distrust toward the workplace, and even then, the 
participant described only feeling this to some extent 
(i.e., “weak”). Saunders and colleagues interpreted 
this as arguably [8]’s most important example of 
ambivalence as being practically absent in their data. 
Moreover, [13] found that in their total sample (N = 
56), 44 participants felt either trust or distrust toward 
a workplace change referent without feeling the 
opposite, which the researchers interpret as 
considerable support for [11]’s postulate that trust 
comprises a continuum. Still, [13] do show some 
evidence for conceptualizations of trust proposed by 
both [8] and [2], as well as [11]. As such, [13] called 
for more research into this debate, and this is exactly 
the purpose of the present research, which includes 
using validated scale measures and examining the 
effects of trust manipulations on two criteria. 
2.4. The Present Research 
Researchers [2; 11] have argued that trust spans a 
continuum ranging from trust to distrust. For [2] and 
[11], it is illogical to assume that trust and distrust 
could co-occur. In contrast, [8] argue that trust is an 
orthogonal construct to distrust such that each are 
unique and could emerge simultaneously. Regardless 
of which perspective is adopted, testing these 
postulates through an analytic approach is needed. To 
the authors’ knowledge, no study has investigated 
whether measures of trust and distrust are measurably 
distinct or simply represent the same trust continuum. 
The current study aims to do this by assessing self-
report measures of trust and distrust before and after a 
task, which comprised a trust manipulation (see 
Method section below). We assessed the correlation 
between the two measures before the trust 
manipulation, after the trust manipulation, and then 
assessed the effect of the trust manipulation on self-
reported trust toward the referent, self-reported 
distrust toward the referent, and compare those effect 
sizes. With this strategy, we assessed whether trust is 
a measurably distinct construct from distrust, and 
practically speaking, whether it is relevant to assess 
trust and distrust with two separate measures. Based 
on the postulates of both [2; 11] and [8], we outline 
two hypotheses and one research question below: 
 
H1: Self-report assessments of trust and distrust will be 
significantly, negatively correlated before a trust 
manipulation. 
 
H2: Self-report assessments of trust and distrust will be 
significantly, negatively correlated after a trust 
manipulation. 
 
RQ1: Does a trust manipulation have differential 
effects on self-reported trust and distrust scales? 
3. Method 
3.1. Participants 
Participants (N = 67) were adults recruited from a 
university in the Midwest. They were randomly 
distributed among two experimental conditions: Trust 
(n = 33) and Distrust (n = 34). Ages ranged between 
18 and 32 years (M = 21.75, SD = 3.70). About half 
(51%) were female and white (40%). Participants were 
recruited from the Introduction to Psychology 
participant pool, flyers, email, and word of mouth. 
Participants received compensation (i.e., a $30 gift 
card) for their participation, as well as cash for all 
money they earned in the task. The study was 
approved and overseen by an institutional review 
board. 
3.2. Task 
The task that participants played over the course 
of the experiment was Checkmate [28]. Checkmate is 
a computer game played usually between two players. 
It is a modified version of the trust (or 
investor/dictator) game [29]. In this study, the 
participant was always assigned the role of the 
“Banker” (investor in the investment/dictator game), 
and a confederate played the role of the “Runner” 
(dictator in the investor/dictator game). The role of the 
Banker was to loan money to the Runner over the 
course of five rounds. The role of the Runner was to 
collect boxes in a virtual maze over the course of five 
rounds. The number of boxes collected by the Runner 
reflected performance. The initial amount of money in 
the Banker’s virtual account was set at $50. The 
Banker loaned money to the Runner each round in 
anticipation of earning interest on their investment. 
Each round, the Banker chose to loan one of three 
amounts to the Runner: small ($1-$7), medium ($4-
$10), or large ($7-$13). Based on their selections, a 
pre-determined algorithm specified the exact dollar 
amount that would be sent to the Runner. 
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The Runner chose a risk level for the purpose of 
potentially increasing the initial loan amount. The risk 
levels were low (75-150%), moderate (50-200%), and 
high (0-300%). The Runner could earn more money 
by choosing a higher risk level, but the Runner risked 
not earning any money at all if his performance was 
poor. If the Runner decided to err on the side of caution 
and chose a low risk level, the maximum amount of 
money the Runner lost was 25% without collecting 
any boxes or gained 50% by performing well. 
At the beginning of the round, the Runner chose a 
risk level. The Runner then promised to return the 
initial loan and 50% of the earnings to the Banker. The 
Banker was notified via a pop-up message which risk 
level the Runner selected as well as how much of the 
invested money the Runner promised to return. At this 
point in the round, the Banker selected an amount to 
loan to the Runner. Money was then transferred into 
the Runner’s virtual wallet. The maze-running task 
began, and the Banker was able to watch a top-down 
video of the Runner’s progress. The Runner was 
allotted two minutes to collect as many boxes as 
possible. After the maze-running task was over, the 
Runner then decided how much money to return to the 
Banker. The Banker received a pop-up message of the 
exact amount of money the Runner decided to return. 
In the Trust condition, the amount returned to the 
Banker was within the range of what the Runner had 
promised for all time points. In the Distrust condition, 
the return amount was lower than promised in two of 
the time points. These steps outlined above were 
repeated over five rounds. Participants were informed 
that the amount of money the Banker had in his/her 
virtual bank at the end of the session belonged to the 
Banker, and the earnings were paid out in the form of 
cash, rounded up to the nearest quarter. 
3.3. Experimental Control and Manipulations 
Typically, Checkmate [28] is played between two 
people. For this study, the participant was always the 
Banker, and the Runner was a male confederate. The 
Runner’s risk level in the game was set to medium-risk 
for every round. All of the Runner’s data, including 
maze performance and returning of investment to the 
Banker, was prerecorded. This level of control allowed 
our team to focus on the way that participants trusted 
their partner. However, participants were led to 
believe they were playing in real-time with the human 
confederate. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
two experimental conditions: Trust or Distrust. In the 
Trust condition, the Runner always returned the 
amount of money that was promised for all rounds. In 
the Distrust condition, the Runner returned less money 
than he promised for rounds 3 and 4. 
3.4. Self-Report Measures 
3.4.1. Trust. Trust was measured with the Trust 
Intentions Scale [27]. This 4-item scale measures a 
person’s willingness or intention to trust others. 
Participants were asked to use a 5-point agreement 
response scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree) to describe how much they agreed or 
disagreed with each statement. The measure was 
adapted so that the referent in each item was “the 
Runner.” To score, the responses were averaged across 
participants. A sample item included “I would be 
willing to let the runner have complete control over my 
future in this game.” 
3.4.2. Distrust. Distrust was measured using the 
Distrust Scale (Adapted from [30]), which is an 8-item 
scale designed to measure a person’s general distrust 
toward others. The measure was adapted so that the 
referent in each item was “the Runner.” We adapted 
and reduced the scale to seven items to ensure 
questions a) were not double loaded and b) were not 
off base in referencing the state-dependent nature of 
the referent. Participants were asked to use a 5-point 
agreement response scale ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) to describe how much 
they agreed or disagreed with each statement. To 
score, the responses were averaged across participants. 
A sample item included “The runner will break rules 
when they have the chance.” 
3.5. Procedure 
Participants were run individually in a laboratory 
comprising two rooms. Participants were introduced to 
each other once they entered the lab and were then 
seated in separate rooms. After providing informed 
consent, participants completed demographic surveys. 
Then, they completed an endowment earning task, 
which consisted of five, medium-difficulty, multiple 
choice math problems. The purpose of this task was to 
make participants feel like they earned the money used 
in the experimental task. Because the money in the 
task was stored in a participant’s virtual wallet, we 
wanted to make this connection as salient as possible. 
Participants were told that based on their performance 
they would earn money to be used in the subsequent 
task if they answered at least three out of five of the 
questions correctly. However, all participants earned 
$50 regardless of their performance in order to ensure 
experimental control. 
Page 5895
Next, participants completed training on 
Checkmate [28], then played a practice round of 
Checkmate with their partner. Participants were told 
they were randomly selected to play the Banker for the 
real session of five rounds and their partner was 
selected to play the Runner. Following the practice 
round, participants completed the first assessment of 
trust and distrust (these assessments were analyzed to 
test H1). Each round lasted approximately three to five 
minutes. Following each round, participants were 
asked to complete other surveys that are beyond the 
scope of this manuscript. After the competition of the 
fifth experimental round, participants completed a 
second and final assessment of trust and distrust 
toward their partner (these assessments were analyzed 
to test H2 and RQ1). Then, participants were debriefed 
and paid for their time with a $30 gift card. The money 
in their virtual wallet was paid to them in cash. 
4. Results  
Hypothesis 1 predicted that trust and distrust 
would be significantly, negatively correlated during an 
initial interaction, prior to a trust manipulation, 
between unfamiliar dyads in a trust game. We found 
support for this hypothesis in that trust and distrust 
were significantly, negatively correlated early in the 
experiment (r = -.49, p < .01). Thus, participants who 
reported that they trusted their partner in the game also 
reported decreased distrust in their partner. In total, 
trust scores explained approximately 25% of the 
variance in distrust scores in early interactions of a 
trust game, prior to a trust manipulation (i.e., Trust or 
Distrust). 
 Hypothesis 2 stated that trust and distrust scores 
would be significantly, negatively correlated 
following a trust manipulation. In accordance with our 
expectations, trust and distrust scores were highly, 
negatively related later in the experiment (r = -.75, p < 
.01). That is, over 50% of the variance in the trust 
scores can be attributed to participants’ distrust scores. 
The more robust correlation between trust and distrust 
at the end of the experiment may signify that as people 
interact, trustors garner more information about 
trustees, strengthening their attributions toward the 
referent (i.e., their (dis)trust toward their partner). 
Finally, we examined the effects of the Runner 
behavior manipulation on measures of trust and 
distrust. That is, we conducted two independent-
samples t-tests to examine the effect sizes (i.e., 
Cohen’s d) of a trust violation on participants’ 
intentions to (dis)trust their partner in future iterations 
of the checkmate protocol. The results showed that 
there was a medium effect [31] of Runner behavior on 
self-reported trust, [t(62) = 2.43, d = 0.60], with those 
in the Trust condition (M = 3.04, SD = 0.81) reporting 
higher levels of trust compared to those in the Distrust 
condition (M = 2.53, SD = 0.86). In comparison, the 
results showed a medium to large effect [31] of the 
Runner behavior factor on self-reported distrust, [t(62) 
= 3.10, d = .77], with participants assigned to the 
Distrust condition (M = 3.05, SD = 0.95) reporting 
higher levels of distrust than those assigned to the 
Trust condition (M = 2.37, SD = 0.79). Thus, there was 
a modest effect size difference (Δd = .17) of Runner 
behavior between reported trust and distrust. 
However, based on the strong negative correlation 
between trust and distrust, we speculate this modest 
difference is a result of scale attributes (e.g., item 
wording) rather than evidence of for two unique 
constructs. 
5. Discussion  
The aforementioned theoretical models of trust 
assume that trust necessitates a willingness to accept 
some degree of vulnerability within an interaction [2; 
8]. Specifically, for trust to be relevant, a trustor must 
experience some kind of risk in their dealings with a 
trustee (i.e., something must be at stake). The models 
of trust proposed by [2] and [8] conceptualize trust 
differently. Specifically, [2] (and later [11]) propose 
that trust spans a continuum, with trust at one end and 
distrust at the other. Distrust is assumed to be the 
absence of trust and therefore composes one pole of 
the trust continuum. In contrast, [8] propose that trust 
and distrust are orthogonal; low trust is not the same 
as high distrust and should therefore be considered 
unique criterion, similar to ambivalence toward a 
referent in neighboring literatures (e.g., [21]). 
The present research aimed to investigate which 
of these two models [2; 8] is more accurate and 
practically relevant. In an experimental context, trust 
was manipulated between subjects, and self-reported 
trust and distrust were assessed before and after 
manipulations took place. The results from the present 
research show that before a trust manipulation occurs, 
self-reported trust and distrust are negatively 
correlated. However, the correlation does not meet the 
conventional threshold in which constructs are thought 
to be the same (i.e., r = .70; [32]). After the trust 
manipulation occurred, these scores were negatively 
correlated, and this correlation was significant. The 
effect sizes attributed to the trust manipulation appear 
to be slightly larger on distrust compared to trust 
scores (as noted above), yet the effects appear to occur 
in a way such that the Trust condition led to higher 
trust scores than distrust scores, and the Distrust 
condition led to higher distrust scores than trust scores. 
All said, participants who reported increased trust 
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toward their partner also reported decreased distrust 
toward their partner, and participants who reported 
increased distrust also reported decreased trust toward 
their partner. This shows evidence that increased trust 
corresponds to decreased distrust (and vice versa), 
supporting the theoretical postulates of [2] and [11] 
and not those of [8]. Based on these data, trust spans a 
continuum with trust at one end and a complete lack 
thereof (or distrust) at the other, evidencing one 
construct with two poles and variability between each 
end [11]. 
It should be noted that once participants interacted 
with one another over the course of the experiment, the 
assessments of trust and distrust correlated above the 
.70 mark. Such a criteria is often used in assessment 
contexts to indicate that two scales are really assessing 
the same underlying construct [32]. The experimental 
task served to bolster perceived risk, which may 
explain the increased effect size when self-reports 
were assessed after the manipulations. This aligns 
with the assumption that trust is relevant when 
something is at risk and hence there is a reason to be 
vulnerable. Additionally, as participants interacted 
with their confederate partner, they garnered more 
information used to strengthen their attributions. This 
may explain the comparatively modest correlation 
between trust and distrust at the beginning of the 
experiment. If parties have yet to garner much 
information to be used in making their attributions of 
one another, then it is likely they are less certain 
whether their partner is trustworthy or untrustworthy 
rather than experiencing ambivalence (i.e., 
experiencing both attributions of trust and distrust 
simultaneously) as [8] would postulate. Put simply: 
people do not have strong attributions of trust and 
distrust toward a referent before interacting, leading to 
a rather modest correlation between measures of trust 
and distrust. After interacting and garnering 
information about a referent (being trustworthy or 
untrustworthy), people can make stronger attributions 
toward a referent’s trustworthiness. In these latter 
cases, researchers have an opportunity to investigate 
whether measures of trust and distrust span a 
continuum without limited interaction tempering the 
relationship between measures. 
It should be noted that [8] did mention that 
although they postulated that trust and distrust were 
orthogonal, the relationship between the two 
constructs should be investigated in future work. 
Mittendorf [26] found that trust and distrust emerged 
as separate constructs; however, in addition to the 
aforementioned limitations of the items [26] leveraged 
(see section 2.2 of this paper), participants may have 
interacted with rideshare drivers over the years and 
may be conflicted in providing a single response 
which encompasses their experiences. Additionally, 
ambivalence in terms of trusting and distrusting a 
referent simultaneously may actually reflect a 
perception toward one characteristic of a referent (e.g., 
driver’s driving ability) compared to another (e.g., 
driver’s timeliness). The ambiguity in terms of trust 
and distrust may be due to not having enough 
information regarding the referent or characteristics of 
that referent. In our study, the referent was clear 
(partner in the task) and the context was clear (maze 
running task), making it easier for participants to make 
a trust/distrust decision. 
We offer the findings that trust and distrust have 
a strong negative correlation. Perceptions of 
trustworthiness fluctuate along a continuum 
depending on the focal feature a trustor considers in 
the referent. This is something that [2] have argued, 
and it may be that the postulates of [8] align with [2] 
if one considers ambivalence to be, rather, varying 
trustworthiness perceptions per referent 
characteristics. For example, a professor (trustor) may 
perceive a colleague (trustee) to cover their statistics 
class but not give their proceedings talk at a 
conference. What [8] consider to be ambivalence—the 
presence of both trust and distrust—is simply the 
trustor perceiving that the trustee is competent in their 
statistical abilities but not in, say, their public speaking 
(for a similar perspective, see [33]). When provided 
with more context in the trust scenario (e.g., trusting 
someone in a certain task), the ambiguity between trust 
and distrust seems to abate; this was demonstrated in 
our study. Prior to the trust manipulation, a negative 
correlation between trust and distrust was found (r = -
.49, p < .01.); at this time, participants had little 
information about their partner and were still 
familiarizing themselves with the task. Conversely, at 
the conclusion of the task, when participants were able 
to gather more information about their partner and the 
task at hand, the negative correlation between trust and 
distrust became stronger (r = -.75, p < .01). 
5.1. Limitations and Future Directions 
Prior to the experimental task, participants were 
asked self-report questions about their partner related 
to trust and distrust. The measure of trust had a 
reliability of .60, and the measure of distrust had a 
reliability of .80. However, by the end of the 
experiment, reliabilities had improved to .70 for trust 
and .95 for distrust. One possible reason that these 
measures had lower reliabilities in the beginning of the 
experiment is because participants were unfamiliar 
with their partners. Theoretically, the participants 
would not know how to reliably answer questions such 
as, “I would be comfortable giving the runner a task or 
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problem which was critical to me, even if I could not 
monitor their actions” [27] or “The runner will break 
rules when they have the chance” [30]. Previous 
research [20] has included a “Don’t know” response 
option in addition to response options ranging from 1 
(not at all) to 5 (a great deal) when measuring 
trustworthiness perceptions because participants may 
not have formed those perceptions prior to extended 
interactions. Future research may want to provide a 
similar response option on scales that measure 
perceptions of others, especially if data are collected 
prior to interactions. In addition, self-report measures 
of trust (and distrust) were taken only twice: once 
before the experiment and once at the end of the 
experiment. Future studies may wish to assess self-
reported trust over many time periods to investigate 
the development of trust over time, its decay when 
violated, and its potential recovery. 
Lastly, the distrust measure was adapted from a 
scale measuring general distrust toward others [30]. 
This scale comprises items which focus on aspects of 
the referent’s character. These items share overlap 
with [2]’s conceptualization of trustworthiness 
perceptions, particularly integrity and benevolence. 
Whereas the [27]’s scale used in the present study 
focused mainly on the trustor’s willingness to be 
vulnerable to the referent, the adapted [30] scale may 
have focused more so on the trustor’s perceptions of 
the referent. Theoretically, however, a trustor’s 
propensity to trust is their general willingness to 
accept vulnerability toward others, i.e., their general 
willingness to trust others. Through the lens of [2]’s 
model of trust—and later that of [11]—the general 
willingness to trust spans the same continuum with 
one’s willingness to distrust others. Thus, we adapted 
a trait-based measure to reference the state-based 
context to assess distrust. Regardless, the items from 
the [30] adapted scale may assess trustworthiness 
rather than trust, and future research may wish to 
replicate and possibly extend the present findings by 
assessing a different measure of distrust. 
5.2. Implications 
Practically speaking, the assessments of trust 
accounted for roughly a quarter of the variance in the 
distrust assessment prior to interactions in the task. 
Prior to gleaning substantive information about the 
referent, each measure (trust and distrust) still 
comprised a substantive proportion of overlapping 
variance. After all experimental interactions, the 
trustor was able to glean more information about the 
referent’s behavior and thus further solidified their 
perceptions of the referent’s trustworthiness and 
ultimately their willingness to be vulnerable to the 
referent. Hence, the correlation between both 
measures was stronger, and each measure comprised 
over 50% of the variance explained by the other. Based 
on these findings, we contend that it may be the most 
practical method to simply assess trust. Both 
researchers and practitioners can benefit from 
reducing the number of self-report items they wish 
their samples to answer, and the findings from this 
experiment show that limiting self-reported 
assessments of trust may be practically informative at 
assessing individuals’ willingness to be vulnerable to 
another instead of assessing the same construct with 
two separate measures. Using one measure potentially 
reduces a biased interpretation of one’s results—here, 
lower correlations between trust and distrust at the 
beginning of an interchange being interpreted as trust 
and distrust being separate constructs— particularly at 
the beginning of an interchange where parties are still 
garnering information about one another. In a world 
where distributed, collaborative work is increasingly 
becoming the new norm, researchers interested in 
assessing trust between parties ought to employ the 
most cost-effective methods to do so. Our research 
provides additional support for the postulates of [2] 
and [11] such that trust and distrust fall on a 
continuum. We do not outright reject the 
considerations posed by [8] but reframe their 
interpretation as being more in line with [11] 
discussion of specificity when making attributions 
toward a referent’s attributes (see also [33]). We 
believe that differences between trust and distrust are 
due to trustworthiness perceptions of different 
characteristics of a referent. 
5.3. Conclusion 
The present research investigated whether trust 
and distrust are more practically represented as two 
sides to a single continuum or are orthogonal 
constructs. Based on robust correlations and similar 
effects of experimental manipulations on trust and 
distrust criterion, there is evidence that self-reported 
measures of trust and distrust may be assessing the 
same underlying construct. Theoretically, this finding 
supports the postulates of [2] and [11], such that trust 
spans a continuum with trust at one end and distrust at 
another. Researchers may wish to assess a measure of 
trust rather than concern themselves with multiple 
self-report measures of the same construct. 
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